Floor Statements
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STATEMENT BY RANKING MEMBER McCAIN ON POSTURE OF DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
March 8, 2011
“Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today to discuss the President’s budget request for 2012 for the Department of the Navy. I'm sure I speak for all Members of our Committee when I say that our thoughts and prayers are with all our deployed Sailors and Marines, particularly those who are currently engaged in combat operations. Their hard work and dedication reflects the very finest traditions of the Department of the Navy. And, of course, their sacrifices are matched only by their families, who have supported these brave men and women in the service of their country.
“While recruiting and retention in the Navy and Marine Corps remain strong, the stress on the force continues to result in dwell-time at home that is shorter than desirable. Given these facts, we must consider carefully plans for 9,000 fewer Sailors and up to 15,000 fewer Marines – as the Department is currently proposing under the budget plan covering the next five years. Even with assurances that those reductions will be ‘conditions-based,’ fiscal constraints may put pressure on the size of the active-duty forces in an effort to cut costs. Whatever reductions in the size of the force are implemented, I am sure that you will keep faith with our Sailors and Marines as you carry out your plans. I expect that you will ask for any force-shaping authorities you will need and, to the maximum extent possible, avoid involuntary separations. We owe those who volunteered to serve in these dangerous times no less.
“While I generally support the Department of the Navy’s 2012 budget submission, I do have concerns about specific areas that I would you to address.
“Joint Strike Fighter: The cost of each F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is expected to come in somewhere between 60 to 90 percent over the original (2001) baseline estimate – costing on average about $140 million each. The Marine Corps’ version appears to be the most troubled and expensive. After Secretary Gates restructured the program last year, he will do so again in the 2012 budget now under consideration. That plan would put the Marine Corps’ version of the aircraft in the back of the flight-test queue to prevent it from continuing to negatively impact the testing and production schedules for the Navy’s and Air Force’s versions. Secretary Gates has said he has put the Marine Corps’ version on a two-year ‘probation.’ If after two years the problems have not been solved, he’ll recommend that it be ended. That having been said, as we start this budget cycle the F-35 development program has slipped yet again and may cost as much as five billion dollars more than we were told this time last year. I remain greatly concerned about the continued volatility of the program.
“Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): The EFV has been about 15 years in development and over that time has been criticized for being too heavy, too noisy, having too limited visibility, suffering from 30mm gun failures, and being too vulnerable to IED attacks. Costs have risen by more than 55 percent over the life of the program such that now each EFV is expected to exceed $23 million. Costs to operate and maintain the vehicle have gone up so much that the Commandant estimates that the EFV would consume 90 percent of the Marine Corps' planned funding for ground combat vehicles in the out-years of the budget when the Marines have other ground combat vehicle requirements to meet. Against that backdrop, Secretary Gates and the Commandant have called for this program to be terminated. Whether the EFV would be allowed to finish its current development phase or be shut down immediately with resulting termination costs of up to $185M is still being worked out. From the Commandant, I would like to know how the Marines will meet the operational requirement for an amphibious assault vehicle, and how soon and at what cost does he believe a replacement design can enter service.
“Littoral Combat Ships (LCS): As you probably know, I continue to think the Navy made a big mistake in going forward with a dual-source strategy on the LCS program. I believe that the true lifecycle costs of buying and sustaining both ships will be considerably more than what the Navy told us. I do not believe it is wise for Congress to authorize what amounts to a ‘bulk buy’ on a program without proving that its key aspects will work as intended and that its sustainability costs are reasonable. In the case of LCS, the Navy could not tell Congress what its plans are for the two different combat systems for the two designs; and, the combined capability of the mission packages with the sea-frames, which gives the ships combat power, remains unproven. I am concerned that the costs of operating and sustaining both variants will eventually require moving to a single combat system or going to a common propulsion and mechanical system. If that is where affordability concerns drive the Navy, why are we buying two versions of this ship? “LPD-17 San Antonio Class Amphibious Ships: From the first ship in this class, this program has displayed major problems in terms of safety, engineering, and the quality of workmanship. Those problems have been so widespread that they give rise to concern about a broader readiness problem afflicting our surface fleet. I am gratified by the leadership of the Atlantic Fleet Commander Admiral Harvey in starting to turn these problems around. But, I am perplexed by how we got to this point. And, as to the LPD-17 class of ships, how (with five delivered and four under construction) we have been left with a class of ships that, according to the Pentagon’s chief tester is ‘not effective, suitable and not survivable in combat.’ In addition to addressing this point, I would also like our witnesses to also address what I see as an overall downward trend in maintenance funding – with the negative impact falling more heavily on the Navy's surface combatants than on carriers and submarines.
“Another area of the Navy’s budget that I am very concerned about is the amount of funding needed for ship construction going forward. The Ohio class replacement ballistic missile submarines run about six to seven billion dollars each and the Virginia class submarines cost about two billion dollars each. With more than half of the construction and development cost dollars being needed to build extraordinarily expensive nuclear submarines, I’m concerned that our commitment to submarines may be crowding out funding needed to modernize the surface fleet. I hope the witnesses can give us their views on the impact of submarine construction costs on surface ship building, including amphibious ships, and how it may impact the shipbuilding industrial base.
“The Department of the Navy faces many difficult challenges. That said, the performance of our Sailors and Marines has never been so gratifying to watch – they make us proud every day. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on these, and other, tough but important issues, which go squarely to how we arm and equip those men and women who serve their Nation so selflessly at home and abroad.
“Thank you, Chairman Levin.”